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Clear the way when you see me comin through
Back up and bow, nuff respect due.
Those are, I need hardly tell you, the words of Big
Daddy Kane. They are but one example of the widespread
use of the term respect in popular culture and particularly
rap music. But it is not just rappers who are interested in
respect, philosophers and lawyers are too.
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
protects the right to respect for private and family life.
Although much attention has been paid to the definitions
of “family” and “private”, less has been paid to the notion
of “respect”. Commentators have even been known to
refer, to the article 8 right as the right to family life.
Occasionally, even judges do. However, omitting the
notion of respect leaves out an important aspect of the
right and a proper understanding of it is essential if the
scope of article 8 is to be appreciated.
This article will consider what “respect” in this context
might mean. It will look at the concept as discussed in the
wider political and philosophical literature. As will be seen
the notion is hotly contested by philosophers and others
who have written on this issue. It is not intended to resolve
these debates, but rather use them as a way of throwing up
some important questions about the potential scope and
meaning of article 8.
ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE RESPECT
The notion of respect is one that has received much
academic attention in recent years. In Britain this is in part
due to the “Respect Agenda” which the Blair Government
pursued with particular vigour in its final years. On
returning to number 10 Downing Street Tony Blair
announced:
“I’ve been struck again and again in the course of this
campaign by people worrying that in our country today,
though they like the fact we have got over the deference of the
past, there is a disrespect that people don’t like.
And whether it’s in the classroom, or on the street in town
centres on a Friday or Saturday night, I want to focus on this
issue. We’ve done a lot so far with anti-social orders and
additional numbers of police.
But I want to make this a particular priority for this
government, how we bring back a proper sense of respect in
our schools, in our communities, in our towns and our
villages.”
Since then we have seen a raft of measures and papers
seeking to increase levels of respect. Pupils receive lessons
on respect in schools, funded by a package the
Government said was worth £13.5 million. The
Government created “respect zones”. If the urge had
taken you could have found them at Derby, Hastings,
Oldham, and Exeter, to name but a few. The Brown
Government seems less supportive of the “respect
agenda”, although www.respect.gov.uk is still up and
running.
This is all well and good, but this trendy word has not
been given a clear meaning. Tony Blair was content to say,
as was his wont in the face of difficult questions of
interpretation: we all know what respect means. Well we
don’t.
The notion of respect is widely thought to be important
and yet there is little agreement on its meaning. As can
often be the case with illusive concepts it is easier to state
what is respect is not, than to define it in a positive sense.
A classic example of a lack of respect is to breach the
Kantian imperative and to treat an individual as a means to
an end. Respect is seen by some as an essential aspect of
treating people equally and recognising their equal moral
worth. If I tell you what to do simply because I prefer you
to act in a particular way this is not showing you respect.
It is not accepting that we have equal moral worth. It
indicates I think my views should carry more weight than
yours about how you should run your life. Parents’
favourite response in answer to their child’s question
“why?” – “because I told you so” – may or may not be
appropriate between parents and children. It is certainly
not appropriate between equal adults. It is disrespectful.
So lack of respect involves not treating another person as
an equal human being, of equal moral worth. Thomas Hill
(Respect, Pluralism, and Justice, 2000, 86) writes:
“respect is . . . something to which we should presume every
human being has a claim, namely full recognition as a
person, with the same basic moral worth as any other.”
The word respect derives from the Latin respicere which
means to look again or look back at. As this indicates to
respect something or someone involves a particular way of
appreciating the thing or person. It means ensuring one is
not indifferent or dismissive of the value or person. But
saying more than this is problematic because of the variety
of contexts in which respect has been used. Robin Dillon
(‘Respect’ in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2003, at 1)
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explains that respect may be used “as a mode of behaviour,
a form of treatment, a kind of valuing, a type of attention,
a motive, an attitude, a feeling, a tribute, a principle, a duty,
an entitlement, a moral virtue, an epistemic virtue”. It is
therefore not surprising that that a singe definition has
proved illusive.
In this article I shall focus primarily on two issues
surrounding the nature of respect, which are of particular
relevance when it comes to interpreting article 8. First I
shall consider whether respect involves valuing the object
respected. Second, whether respect for family life requires
a manifestation in action or is essentially a requirement of
inaction.
IS ALL FAMILY LIFE ENTITLED TO
RESPECT?
I will seek to argue next that to respect family life means
to acknowledge that there is something of value within the
family life in question. A useful starting point for this
argument is to consider the distinction between tolerance
and respect. You might tolerate your neighbour’s raucous
parties that keep you up all night, without respecting your
neighbour for holding them. Both respect and toleration
involve a recognition that someone should be permitted to
engage in an activity or at least that one should not
intervene to prevent them. However, respect (unlike
toleration) requires a recognition that the thing or person
respected has some moral worth. This is not, of course, to
say you necessarily agree or even approve of it. An
academic may be respectful of her colleague’s output, even
while fundamentally disagreeing with her viewpoint. But it
would seem that respect would only be appropriate if some
merit was recognised. If the academic believed all her
colleague’s work to be plagiarised it would not be correct
to talk of it being respected. Respect then indicates that
one, at least regards the other’s views as having legitimacy
and some moral worth, even if one believes them to be
misguided.
But precisely what kind of worth is recognised when you
respect something? Stephen Darwall (“Two Kinds of
Respect”, (1977) 88 Ethics 36) has suggested that there are
two main kinds of respect: recognition respect and
appraisal respect. Recognition respect does not necessarily
involve approval, but it involves an appreciation that there
are appropriate responses to the subject due to its status or
position in society. This creates a disposition to give the
interests of the subject due weight when making a decision.
For example, to respect the law is to give due weight to
one’s legal obligations when deciding how to act. This you
might do even if you believe the law to be a bad one.
Appraisal respect, by contrast, involves a positive
assessment of a person or reason. You may have appraisal
respect for a world class athlete or a parent who cares well
for their child because you admire what they do. Appraisal
respect can be fairly nuanced. We may admire some
aspects of a person’s character but not others (they are a
great lawyer, but a lousy parent) and we may have degrees
of appraisal respect (he is a great poet, but she is even
greater). By contrast recognition respect is respect for a
person’s standing or status and there should be an equal
level of respect for all those of the same status.
Article 8 and the meaning of respect
This discussion is important in the context of article 8,
for three main reasons. First, as we have just seen respect
does not require approval, but it requires the recognition
of at least some moral value. This is significant for the
definition of family within article 8. If respect, while not
requiring admiration, at least requires a recognition of
some value or moral worth, this indicates that the state is
required to respect any family form which has value, even
if it falls short of the government’s ideal. A conservative
government might regard married family life as the ideal
family form to be promoted, but should respect all family
forms that have value. So the notion of respect indicates
that “family” in article 8 should not be given a narrow
definition, restricted to what might be regarded as an ideal.
Second, the notion of respect requires valuing of all
forms of family which exhibit the desired characteristic. As
Dillon (“Respect” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,
2003, at 1) argues: “respect is universalizing, in the sense
that if F is a respect-warranting feature of object O, then
respecting O on account of F commits us, other things
equal, to respecting other things that also have feature F. In
respect, then, subjectivity defers to objectivity.” This
indicates that we should not exclude from our
understanding of “family” in article 8 those intimate
relationships which have the desirable characteristics that
families have. Again this would point to a broad definition
of “family” for the purposes of article 8.
A third, but more controversial argument, is that some
living arrangements have no value worthy of respect. This
might arise where a family relationship involved the abuse
and/or oppression of its members. If child abuse is
uncovered then the abuser parent-child relationship may
cease to be a family form deserving of respect and
therefore protected by Article 8. Of course, there may be
some families where even though there are occasions of
abuse, there is still sufficient value left in the relationship
that it is entitled to respect. However, in other cases the
relationship itself has become a tool of abuse. In such a
case the family would be so devoid of moral worth and
hence could not be entitled to respect under article 8.
One response to my argument would be to refer to
Darwall’s distinction and claim that while a family
relationship characterised by abuse may lose any
entitlement to appraisal respect, it should still be entitled
to recognition respect. In other words although the
relationship no longer is respected for the benefits it
produces for its members it must be respected by virtue of
having the status of a family relationship. An analogy may22
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be drawn with, say, a religious leader living an immoral life.
While he would be entitled to no appraisal respect,
members of his religion might still owe recognition respect
due to his status as a cleric.
I don’t agree with this argument. I am not convinced
that the family status per se is entitled to respect. But to
substantiate that claim we need to examine further what the
worth of family life is. What is it, then, in family life that is
entitled to respect? This is a huge question which it is not
possible to do justice to, but I will sketch two responses to
this which have been advocated by commentators.
The care model
One model sees the care and nurture provided within
family as providing its central value. This includes the care
between adults, but in particular the production and
raising of children. This sees the worth of a family not on
its status or formal structure, but rather on the work done
in the relationship. For many adopting this approach it is
the care and particularly the care of dependents performed
within families that give them their worth.
Under such a model whether the family relationship is
marked by serious abuse this benchmark of the family is
lost. The value of the family is gone. Without care there
is nothing to value. What makes us normally respect
families is absent.
“The intimacy model”
A rather different understanding of what it is in families
that leads one to value then can be locating in the writing
of John Eekelaar (Family Law and Personal Life, 2007). He
sees central to the respect for personal law is recognition of
the value of the intimate. Without such recognition love is
unlikely to flourish. He explains:
“there is, or should be, a sphere of personal interaction,
whether between adults with one another, or between adults
and children, which is privileged in the way I will describe. I
have in mind behaviours ranging from everyday communication
and modes of dealing with routine events, and the allocation of
domestic roles, to emotional interactions, strategies for coping
with difficulties and crises, mutual participation in diversionary
activities, modes of care and so on. My claim is that, while
individuals of course draw upon moral and social norms in
their conduct in these context, they should do so free from
institutional constraint and censure.” (p 84)
He then explains that the value which is being respected
is “the value of having space to develop one’s personality
and personal interaction free from the external gaze.”
Importantly he argues that this is irrespective of the
“inherent capacity of the activity to advance the well-being
either of the actors or of others.” (p 85)
Crucially for our argument, Eekelaar is clear that this
privileged sphere is not a licence for harming. He explains
“the value that is respected by conferring freedom in the
privilege sphere is defeated if the behaviour harms anyone
within or outside that sphere.” Indeed he reminds his
readers that respect for the privileged sphere is about
allowing love to flourish. Whether, therefore there is violence
“respect for the privileged sphere would demand
intervention.” (p 86). Eekelaar does not put his argument in
terms of the fact that the relationships has lost its entitlement
to respect. However, it is hard to see how a relationship can
be entitled to respect, when at the same time respect requires
the law to intervene to disrupt the relationship.
We have seen then, two different accounts of what it is
in family life which is entitled to respect. Be it an account
based on the significance of the value of caring or an
account based on the values of intimacy and love; neither
requires respect for relationships characterised by violence
or abuse. Indeed Eekelaar argues quite the opposite that
respect would require intervention.
Respecting family and private life
I have a second argument for why an abusive or
oppressive relationship lacks respect under article 8. It is
that article 8 protects both the right to respect for family
life as well as the right to respect for private life. Within
the right to respect for private life is the right to bodily
integrity. Not only that but also “psychological integrity…
a right to personal development, and the right to establish
and develop relationships with other human beings and the
outside world.” (Pretty v UK (2002) 12 BHRC 149, para
61). Article 8 has been interpreted to mean that not only
must the state not infringe someone’s bodily or
psychological integrity, but also the state must ensure that
one person’s integrity is not interfered with at the hands of
another. Where, therefore, there is an abusive family
situation there is an incompatibility between a state’s
respect for family life and respect for the private life of the
individual members.
It might be thought there is a ready solution to this
dilemma and that is to say that although there is a right to
respect for family life, an interference in it is justified in
order to protect the right to respect for private life of the
members. This approach, it is submitted, should not be
taken. It is undoubtedly possible to justify an infringement
of one right by reference to another right. This is certainly
so where the rights are protecting different values. Hence,
for example, a person’s right to respect for their home,
may be interfered with if it is necessary to protect another
person’s right to bodily integrity. However, in a case where
it is the family life which is itself abusive and interfering
with an individual’s right to respect for private life, one
cannot both respect the individual’s rights and the family
life. In other words one cannot respect conduct (abusive
family life) which is itself interfering with something else
you are required to respect (individual bodily integrity). It
is, therefore, impossible to respect both the abusive family
life and respect the private life of the victim at the same
time. 23
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I cannot claim that the courts have adopted the view
proposed here. Even in cases of horrific child abuse the
courts have accepted the existence of article 8 family life
rights between parents and children, only readily to find that
the interference with those rights is justified. One can
understand the attraction of such an approach. It means that
public authorities must ensure that their interventions are
justifiable even in the most apparently awful cases. This
highlights, I accept, the fact that my argument may be of
limited practical significance. For whenever the family form
loses an entitlement to respect on my argument, it is
inevitable that in any event there would have been a
justification for an interference in the right. Nevertheless
there is theoretical importance in the fact that the state
should not be required to respect abusive forms of family life.
The notion of rights being suspended or forfeited
through abusive conduct at first sight sound dangerous to
many human rights lawyers. The concept is, however, not
alien to human rights. Article 17 of the ECHR states:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of
the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation
to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
The European Court of Human Rights in Zdanoka v
Latvia (Application no 58278/00, June 17, 2004) explained
that the purpose of article 17 was to ensure that the rights
under the Convention were not exploited. This could be
used as the basis for a claim that the misuse of family life
to oppress others can lead to a forfeiture of the right.
WHAT DOES RESPECT INVOLVE?
Philosophers have much debated what kind of “thing”
respect is: is it an attitude, an action, a principle or a
virtue? It is widely accepted that respect is more than a
mere feeling. Respect requires more than just having
positive emotions about a subject. Part of respect is
ensuring that proper attention is given to the thing which
is respected when one is deciding how to act. In other
words the respect we have for the thing or persons causes
us to respond to it in a particular way.
Robin Dillon (“Respect” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy, 2003) argues that there can be four dimensions
of respect. First there are cognitive dimensions. Respect
involves a belief or acknowledgement that an item deserves
respect. Second she argues there is an affective dimension:
respect involves an emotion or feeling. Respect involves
more than simply an intellectual acknowledgement of
value, but includes a feeling or emotion towards the thing.
Third, a conative dimension: respect motivates a person so
that they are disposed to act, or not to act, in a way as a
result of respect. Finally, she suggests a behavioural
element. Appropriate behaviour includes refraining from
certain treatment of the object or acting in particular ways
as is fitting, deserved by, or owed to the object.
So it is accepted that respect affects the way that the
object is treated. But what does this mean in the context
of the right to respect for family life?
The ECHR and positive obligations
The European Court of Human Rights has made it clear
that article 8 is primarily negative in effect: an obligation
not to interfere with family and private life. However,
there are in addition some positive obligations that are
inherent in the notion of respect. These may require a
state to adopt measures and act in a way to ensure proper
respect is demonstrated. In Folgero v Norway ((App no
15472/02) para 84) it was explained:
“The verb ‘respect’ means more than ‘acknowledge’ or ‘take
into account.’ In addition to a primarily negative undertaking,
it implies some positive obligation on the part of the State.”
In Evans v UK ([2007] 2 FCR 5, para 75) it was held:
“Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of
protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the
public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to
abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations
inherent in an effective respect for private life. These
obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations
of individuals between themselves. The boundaries between the
State’s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do
not lend themselves to precise definition. The applicable
principles are nonetheless similar. In particular, in both
instances regard must be had to the fair balance which has to
be struck between the competing interests; and in both
contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation”
(Odièvre, cited above, § 40).
The following are examples of positive obligations that
have been found to be required under article 8:
• To ensure there was an effective investigation and
prosecution of a sexual assault (X and Y v Netherlands
(1985) 8 EHRR 235).
• To take reasonable steps to enforce a court order
granting a parent contact with their child (Hokkanen v
Finland (1994), 19 EHRR 139).
• To consult with a birth father before an application for
adoption is made (Keegan v Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342).
• To ensure there is a legal mechanism so that a child of
an unmarried couple has the same rights as any other
child (Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330).
By contrast the following have not been held to be
required by the ECHR:
• That one parent provide another with sufficient financial
support that they did not need to have paid work and
could instead spend their time caring for children
(Andersson and Kullman v Sweden (1986) 46 DR 251).24
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• To provide financial and other assistance to prisoners so
that they could remain in contact with their family
(Andersson and Kullman v Sweden (1986) 46 DR 251).
• To allow the use of embryos after one of those whose
gametes were used to create them had withdrawn
consent (Evans v UK [2007] 2 FCR 5).
The European Court of Human Rights has avoided
making generalisations about when a positive obligation
may arise and so it is not easy to find a consistent rational
for when a positive obligation is or is not found under the
ECHR. Surprisingly there has been little academic
attention given to the question too. In part this may be due
to the fact that the circumstances in which a positive
obligation may arise are so wide-ranging that generalised
statements are hard to make. However, I suggest that the
courts academics have too readily lumped together
“positive obligations” while they can be usefully broken
down as follows:
(1) The European Court of Human Rights has
recognised the principle that an individual has rights which
the state is required to protect. By doing nothing the state
can ensure that it itself does not interfere with a right. But,
to ensure that the citizen’s right is not interfered with by
another, the state must act positively by creating and
enforcing laws or other means. For example, in A v UK
((1999) 27 EHRR 611, para 22) looking at the issue of
corporal punishment, it was held:
“Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are
entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence,
against such serious breaches of personal integrity.”
In that case the failure of the state to criminalise severe
corporal punishment infringed the child’s article 3 rights.
The state therefore in so far as is reasonable must enact
laws to protect individuals from rights-infringing conduct
and ensure those laws are enforced by the state authorities.
As Stephanie Palmer (“A wrong turning: Article 3 ECHR
and Proportionality,” (2006) CLJ 438) has argued, without
such an interpretation the protection of the rights under
articles 3 and 8 would be “seriously diluted or even
ineffective.”
(2) Positive obligations can be imposed upon the state to
ensure that state intervention is proportionate.
Proportionality requires that any state intervention in
family life is the minimum necessary to achieve the
legitimate article 8(2) aim. Hence when a child is taken
into care this is an interference in the right to respect for
family life. It may, however, be justified as necessary in
order to protect the interests of the child. However, such
an interference may be the minimum necessary and hence
there are obligations on the state to act positively in order
to promote on-going contact between the child and parent.
(3) Positive obligations are imposed to ensure there is
an effective way of complaining about breaches of human
rights. Without the state ensuring there is an effective
enforcement mechanism where rights have been infringed
or are in danger of being infringed the rights are of little
practical use. In the family context this includes a right to
seek court orders where a person believes the state or
another has interfered with family life.
(4) There is the recognition that rights require not just
the protection from interference from others but the
creation of positive environments. Traditionally rights
were seen in negative terms about limiting the interference
in the state – negative restraints on the power of the state
or crown. However, times have changed. As Padriac
Kenna (“Housing rights: Positive duties and enforceable
rights at the European Court of Human Rights” [2008]
EHRLR 193) puts it:
“social democracy had moved the notion of human rights from
a negative obligation on the state preventing interference with
property or capital ownership or accumulation, to one where it
was recognised that rights involved state positive obligations to
ensure individual welfare for all citizens.”
Hence we currently see increasing interest in socio-
economic rights protecting economic welfare and fair
shares in the wealth of society. As Sandra Fredman
(“Human rights transformed: positive duties and positive
rights” [2006] Public Law 498) explains this creates a
complex picture of citizen-state relations:
“The state’s responsibility is no longer conceived of as a
unidirectional provider of a package of benefits, but instead in
terms of facilitation and empowerment of individuals.
Correspondingly, the rights bearer is characterised as an active
agent instead of a passive recipient. Nor does responsibility
flow only between the state and the individual. Also brought
into focus is the role of community, within which the
responsibilities of individuals to each other are valued together
with the individual’s self interest.”
What is the relevance of these points to positive
obligations in the sphere of family life? It is that the state
has an obligation to give citizens the ability to enjoy the
goods of family life. Quite what this means will depend on
what one regards as the virtues of family life. As mentioned
earlier, the care model and the intimacy model might
indicate rather different responses here.
Intimacy and positive intervention
As already mentioned, one point of view is that respect
for family life, at least as far as the state is concerned, is
primarily or even exclusively shown but “keeping out” of
family life. John Eekelaar sees the value of family life as
part of the recognition of the intimate. Respect of the
intimate is necessary for love to flourish. He therefore
calls for a sphere of personal interaction which should be
free from “institutional constraint and censure”. However,
he argues that intervention can be required where harm
occurs. 25
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Notice that the argument here is not that where there is
violence interference in the right to respect for family and
private life is justified; nor even that where there is violence
the Article ceases to be relevant. Rather it is that respect
actually requires intervention. However, for Eekelaar
respect of personal life primarily means non-intervention,
it is only in the case of violence that positive intervention
is required. Generally it is the absence of state regulation
and observation that that intimacy and the benefits of it are
able to flow and is the proper mark of respect for family
life.
Martha Fineman
Martha Fineman sees the primary family form as a
caregiver-dependent relationship. She explains that such
relationships do deserve to be protected by autonomy of
the individuals, but understood in a special way.
“Autonomy …would protect entity decision making, giving
the unit the respect and authority to self-govern, and
including the right of self-definition. Autonomy does not
presuppose that the family would be separate from society.
The family would be anchored firmly within society, and
subsidized and supported by market and state, but would
retain authority within its parameters.”
This would involve a far greater degree of positive
intervention from the state by way of supporting and
subsidising the caring. The intervention should not,
however, deprive the functioning of the relationship, unless
it “grossly fails”. Further the means of state support and
subsidy should not be at the cost of interfering in how the
family organises itself.
I find much to support in Robin Dillon’s concept of care
respect (“Respect and Care: Towards Moral Integration”,
(1992) 22 Canadian Journal of Moral Philosophy 105). She
contrasts it with the traditional Kantian view of respect
which involves staying out of other people’s business. She
argues
“So, while Kantian respect might be thought to distance us
from one another (recall: ‘The principle of respect admonishes
men to keep themselves at a distance from one another’), both
in hiding our particular selves from one another and in
erecting protective barriers of rights against each other, care
respect can be seen to involve a determination to discover,
forge, repair, and strengthen connections among persons in
ways that benefit all of us. Care respect joins individuals
together in a community of mutual concern and mutual aid,
through an appreciation of individuality and interdependence”
While seeing that primarily in the context of respect
between individuals, the concept can be used to state
services. In particular when arguing as follows:
“[R]espect requires not so much refraining from interference
as recognizing our power to make and unmake each other as
persons and exercising this power wisely and carefully.
Respecting others also involves, more positively, caring for
others by responding to their needs, promoting their well-
being, and participating in the realization of their selves and
their ends.”
Such an understanding of respect can indicate a model
where the state is required to offer services to families as
they struggle with family life. Central to the notion of care
respect in this context would be a recognition that each
family is different and what they are seeking to achieve and
what they need from the state will vary enormously. To
some what will be required from the state is simply
inaction; but for others it will involve the offering and
assistance in burdens of family life. Proper respect then
would require the state to recognise the benefits of the care
offered in family life and offer support where wanted by
the family. This model sees state as an enabler and assister
of family life. That, it is suggested, is what respecting
family life should be seen as involving.
CONCLUSION
I have sought in this article to highlight the significance
of the word respect in article 8. In particular I have
explored two questions. The first is the meaning of the
word respect as including recognising that something has
value or worth. This is significant for the purposes of
article 8. It means that a narrow definition of family is not
appropriate for article 8. Family forms do not have to
perfect to be respected; but all family forms that have the
value we treasure in families should be respected.
However, it has also been argued that some family forms
which are oppressive or abusive of their members that they
lose entitlement to respect.
Second, I have considered the extent to which respect
for family life requires positive intervention by the state. I
have argued that this question turns on the nature of the
value which is promoted within family life. This is a
controversial issue on which there is no consensus.
However, I have sought to promote an understanding of
respect that sees the role of the state being to empower and
enable families to flourish and promote the interests of
their members. This requires more than that the state
sitting back and avoiding intervention but requires positive
assistance from the state to respond to the needs of the
particular family.
• This article is taken from a lecture given by the author
at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on June 3.
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